WIKILEAKS ha pubblicato recentemente oltre 250.000 documenti del dipartimento di Stato americano. Circa 270 cables riguardano la corrispondenza, la maggior parte della quale è classificata come "confidential", tra l'Ambasciatore Christopher Dell, i suoi stretti referenti e diretti superiori. Uno dei più recenti, datato 29 gennaio 2010, affronta il delicato argomento del nord Kosovo. Il file in questione, dal titolo "STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION" mette in evidenza la delicatezza dell'argomento, la posizione americana, il ruolo dei partners europei, della Kfor, nonché le preoccupazioni del numero uno dell'Ambasciata Usa, che in merito al nord del Kosovo scrive "non intervenire presto significherebbe perdere il Kosovo settentrionale e riaprire il vaso di Pandora del conflitto etnico che ha definito gli anni '90".
Tutti i file sul Kosovo sono consultabili seguendo questo link Wikileaks:
VZCZCXYZ0018 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHPS #0048/01 0291235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291235Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9662 INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0049 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0643 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0459 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0990 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1339 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1877
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000048 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHIL GORDON FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4(b),(d). 1. (C) Phil - I know that you are seeing Robert Cooper on Tuesday, February 2, among other things, to discuss Kosovo and the strategy for northern Kosovo. Integrating Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo society and preserving the country's territorial integrity is central to Kosovo's and the region's long-term stability and has been a core U.S. policy objective since 1999. In November 2009, we had a breakthrough that ended ten years of Belgrade-imposed stalemate when thousands of Serbs in southern Kosovo took part in Kosovo municipal elections. We want to replicate that success in the north and end the stalemate that has left Kosovo's future uncertain. That fundamentally is what the so-called northern strategy is about. We want to coax the population into greater cooperation with Pristina, not to impose outcomes on them. 2. (C) Currently, we have a growing, if still somewhat fragile, consensus within the international community in Pristina that the time is right to end the years of drift on the north and to alter the dynamic of a hardening partition between the north and the rest of Kosovo. In part, this is sparked by the new willingness among Kosovo Serbs to engage with Kosovo institutions. It also stems from Belgrade's increasingly aggressive actions in the north (e.g., seizure of the Valac electrical substation; unilateral appointment of Serb judges to illegal parallel courts) that have underscored to representatives of the international community on the ground the risks of continuing to do nothing. For ten years, we told the Kosovars to trust us -- "let us handle the situation, and we will protect you" -- and now the government of independent Kosovo is increasingly asking us when we are going to make good on that commitment. KFOR is drawing down (in six months NATO could take a decision to cut its forces in half). We need to take advantage of a unique opportunity that has crystallized and act now while we still have a KFOR presence capable of handling any contingency. 3. (C) Belgrade has reacted vehemently to the northern strategy. I think this intensity is rooted in the concern that any positive momentum in the north will undermine Belgrade's likely post-ICJ strategy: push to reopen status talks and formalize the emerging de facto partition of Kosovo. Furthermore, Belgrade has shrewdly judged that raising the specter of confrontation rattles our EU partners and is an effective tactic for derailing the strategy altogether. Cooper will likely reflect this anxiety with you, but I do not sense that this concern is nearly as strong within the local Quint (with the exception of Italian Ambassador Michael Giffoni, who spent ten years on Javier Solana's staff, where the Brussels bureaucrats have long been anxious about taking any difficult decision on the north). With this in mind, I recommend that you stress three points with Cooper. First, the northern strategy is not radical. Much of it restates what the international community, in general, and the EU, in particular, are already committed to doing. Second, it provides a vehicle for constructively channeling the GOK's ambitions for the north and takes advantage of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's readiness to offer inducements to northern Serbs who engage with Kosovo institutions. Third, we now have legitimate Serb partners (elected by fellow Serbs) who are ready to help us in the north. These are the elements of a soft approach, which is the northern strategy's leading edge. 4. (C) We should expect Belgrade to challenge all elements of the strategy and to misportray the strategy as hard and confrontational. Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic has already declared that Pristina is promoting conflict. This is not the case. There is no interest here in conflict (not among the Quint and the ICO, nor within the GOK), but the current situation is untenable and deteriorating. The aim is to stop the rot in the north and create the positive momentum there that we need to secure our long-term policy objectives: a secure and stable Kosovo and a Serbia focused on its EU future, not old ambitions and grievances. We need to start the process now, and we should not allow Belgrade to use threats of confrontation as a veto to block progress. 5. (C) You can tell Cooper that the northern strategy offers incremental, but fundamental, steps necessary to getting the north right. We know, however, that there will be difficult challenges that pose risks. For example, EULEX must get serious about rolling up organized crime networks in the north that feed the parallel structures and make the current situation unsustainable. The northern Serbs are the first victims of these thugs, and there is a growing body of reports that they would welcome a change if EULEX can deliver it. We must, also, deal with the blatant theft of Kosovo property that has allowed Serbia to, in effect, seize the northern power grid in Kosovo. Dealing with these issues will require hard choices and fortitude. Our message to Cooper should be that we want to coordinate and consult with Brussels every step of the way. This process, after all, only works if Brussels makes clear to Belgrade that its EU future depends on real cooperation on Kosovo. In recent meetings with Boris Tadic, both Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly emphasized that Serbia's path to Brussels runs, in part, through constructive relations with Pristina. This is the perfect message. Brussels needs to repeat it -- regularly. We, of course, are also ready to consult with Belgrade, as well, and to offer them the opportunity to engage constructively. Where we part company with some within the EU, however, is in not being willing to accept that we must have Belgrade's agreement before taking any steps. 6. (C) I need to emphasize the importance of this moment. Failure to act soon means losing northern Kosovo and will re-open the Pandora's Box of ethnic conflict that defined the 1990s. Fortunately, our European partners increasingly recognize this. My British colleague here confirms what Stu has also heard -- that there is a greater degree of commitment and resolve in member capitals than may be the case in the Commission and the Council officialdom in Brussels. Even there, though, initial anxieties over the strategy appear to be easing as they look more carefully at the content and less at the rhetoric. DELL